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LEGAL AND POLITICAL SOURCES OF THE
TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR
EUROPE
Jo Shaw, Professor and Jean Monnet Chair of European Law,
University of Manchester, Senior Research Fellow at the Federal
Trust for Education and Research, London'
INTRODUCTION
The focus of this paper is the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for
Europe, prepared by the Convention on the Future of Europe between the
end of February 2002 and the middle of July 2003,2 and the subsequent work
done by the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) convened in October 2003
This paper builds upon my previous work on the development of a European
Constitution, especially a paper published as 'What's in a Convention', in J. Shaw,
P. Magnette, L. Hoffmann and A. Verges Bausili, The Convention on the Future of
the Union: Working Towards an EU Constitution, London: Federal Trust/Kogan
Page, (2003). I would like to acknowledge the comments of a number of people,
including some quite 'close' to the Convention's core, who should in all conscience
remain anonymous, but who saved me from a number of misunderstandings of the
workings of the Convention, but I remain, of course, responsible for any errors
contained herein. I am grateful to the many people who made comments on various
papers which I have drafted or presented on the Convention and the Constitutional
Treaty, and for the assistance of the members of the EU Constitution team at the
Federal Trust.
2OJ 2003 C169/01. For commentary on the draft Constitutional Treaty see: I.
Pernice and M.P. Maduro (eds), A Constitution for the European Union: First
Comments on the 2003-Draft of the European Convention, 2004; A. Arnull,
'Member States of the European Union and Giscard's Blueprint for its Future',
(2004) 27 Fordham International Law Journal 503; J. Temple Lang, 'The main
issues after the Convention on the Constitutional Treaty for Europe', (2004) 27
Fordham International Law Journal 544; P. Birkinshaw, 'A Constitution for the
European Union? - A Letter from Home', (2004) 10 European Public Law 57; P.
Craig, 'Competence: clarity, conferral, containment and consideration', (2004) 29
European Law Review 323; A. Dashwood, 'The Draft EU Constitution - First
Impressions', (2002-2003) 5 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 419;
M. Dougan, 'The Convention's draft Constitutional Treaty: bringing Europe closer
to its lawyers?', (2003) 28 European Law Review 763; J. Dutheil de la Roch&re,
'The EU and the Individual: Fundamental Rights in the Draft Constitutional
Treaty', (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 345; J. Klabbers and P. Leino,
'Death by Constitution? The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe', (2003)
4 German Law Journal 1293 <www.germanlawjournal.com>; J. Kokott and A.
Ruth, 'The European Convention and Its Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution
for Europe: Appropriate Answers to the Laeken Questions?', (2003) 40 Common
Market Law Review 1315; J. Ziller, La nouvelle Constitution europeenne, 2004; P.
Craig, 'What Constitution does Europe need? The House that Giscard built:
Constitutional Rooms with a View,' Federal Trust Online Constitutional Essay,
26/2003 <www.fedtrust.co.uk/euconstitution>; M. Dougan, 'The Convention's
Draft Constitutional Treaty: A 'Tidying-Up Exercise' That Needs Some Tidying-
Up Of Its Own', Federal Trust Online Constitutional Essay, 27/2003
<www.fedtrust.co.ukleuconstitution>.
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to prepare a final version of this Treaty. This work culminated in political
agreement amongst the Heads of State and Government of the Member
States at the meeting of the European Council in Brussels in June 2004 on a
Treaty, due for signature on 29 October 2004 in Rome.3 This text will in
turn be placed before the Member States for ratification in accordance with
their respective constitutional requirements.4 If the so-called Constitutional
Treaty (CT)' is ratified by all the Member States and enters into force, it will
replace the existing EU and EC Treaties, and associated protocols and
annexes, as well as giving legal force to the declaratory Charter of
Fundamental Rights, agreed in 2000.6
The broad objective is to place these various texts in a wider constitutional
context. That is to say, the paper works from the premise that the EU has
been engaged for some time, in particular but not solely through the
Convention and IGC processes, in a constitution-building project. This
constitution-building process can itself be broken down into a number of
interdependent but partially separate elements. The particular focus of this
paper is the work undertaken by the Convention in elaborating the initial
draft, which the IGC then worked on to produce the final text. The
Convention was a novel element superimposed onto the existing EU Treaty
amendment procedure as a result of the Laeken Declaration of the European
Council in December 2001.' The text produced by the Convention was in
turn essentially informal in nature and has been altered in many significant
respects by the ensuing IGC, even though strenuous efforts were made
within the Convention context by leading figures such as the President
Valdry Giscard d'Estaing to ensure that the product of the Convention would
be something which was already acceptable to the Member States. This has
3 See the final agreed (and renumbered) text: CIG 87/04, 6 August 2004. Until this
final version, each separate Part (I-IV) of the Constitutional Treaty had been
numbered from 1. This gave rise to numbering such as Article 1-1; Article 11-1;
Article lII-1, etc. In the final version, a small number of provisions were reassigned
(e.g. the provision on symbols, flag and motto, originally included in Part IV by the
Convention was moved to Part I). The whole Constitutional Treaty is now
numbered Articles 1-448, but the location of different articles in different Parts of
the Treaty is designated by the prefix of a roman numeral. Thus Article II-1, in the
old version, is now Article 11-61. The impact of this is greatest upon Part 11, which
is the Charter of Fundamental Rights, of which some articles were already quite
well known. It will be quite confusing initially that Articles 51-54 of the Charter -
the so-called horizontal clauses concemed with the effects of the Charter - are
being renumbered Articles 1I-111-114 CT.
4 Art 48 of the Treaty on European Union.
For initial comment on the final text of the Constitutional Treaty, see J.
Emmanoulidis, Historically Unique, Unfinished in Detail - An Evaluation of the
Constitution, Bertelsmann Foundation Paper on EU Reform, 2004/03 <www.eu-
reform.de>; Centre for European Reform, The CER Guide to the EU's
Constitutional Treaty, Policy Brief, July 2004 <www.cer.org.uk>. D. Phinnemore,
The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe: An Overview, RIIA EP BN 04-
01 <www.chathamhouse.org.uk>.
60J 2000 C364/01.
7 Annexes to the Presidency conclusions - Laeken, 14 and 15 December 2001, SN
300/01 ADD 1, ANNEX I, Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European
Union <http://european-convention.eu.int/pdf/LKNEN.pdf>.:
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been described as 'bargaining in the shadow of the IGC'.' However, as
regards the specific issues of substance discussed in this paper, the IGC made
no major changes to the materials prepared by the Convention.
The debate about a putative European Constitution did not emerge suddenly
during the Convention. On the contrary, it has been widely argued,
especially by legal academics and those working within the European Union
institutions, that the EU has long had a type of 'unwritten' and composite
constitution, based on the principles of the EU legal order developed by the
Court of Justice, and supplemented by key aspects of the Treaty framework.
This has often been described as the Court of Justice's 'constitutionalisation'
of the Treaties, and a particular focus is placed upon the principles of
supremacy and direct effect, the development of concepts of competence,
and the articulation of a doctrine of fundamental rights. The Court of Justice
did announce in the 1986 case of Les Verts9 that the EC Treaty can be
characterised as the Community's 'constitutional charter'.'
Thus the Convention did not operate against the background of a
constitutional tabula rasa in relation to either the process of constitution-
building or the substantive constitutional 'choices' which it made when it
prepared the different parts of its draft of the Constitutional Treaty. But
constitution-building in the EU since the inception of the first treaties has
always comprised a set of complex interactions and tensions between the
Treaty texts and other formal and even informal institutional documents (e.g.
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2000), on the one hand, and their
interpretation by key actors, notably the Court of Justice, but also the
national courts, and the other non-judicial EU institutions, on the other. This
has been characterised as a distinction between the 'formal' and 'real'
constitutions of the EU," and as a form of 'low intensity' constitutionalism.
2
This complex patchwork of constitutional norms and practices maps onto
both the procedural and substantive dimensions of the Convention's work.
The core of the argument is that the acquis is a key political and legal source
8 See P. Magnette and K. Nicolaides, 'The European Convention: Bargaining in the
shadow of rhetoric', (2004) 27 West European Politics 381.
9 Case 294/86 Parti Ecologiste 'Les Verts' v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339. It
repeated the point in Opinion 1/91 Draft Agreement on a European Economic Area
(EEA) [1991] ECR 1-6079. It is sometimes remarked upon that the Court has not
repeated this point since the European Union famously ran aground on the sands of
the legitimacy question, in the wake of the Maastricht ratification debacle.
lO Some commentators caution that since the inception of the EU - i.e. the entry into
force of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 - the Court of Justice has avoided
'constitutional' language, and has certainly not characterised the overall 'pillar
framework' introduced by the Treaty on European Union as the EU's
constitutional charter, as it did for the EC Treaty in Les Verts.
" G. de BOrca, 'The Institutional Development of the EU: A Constitutional
Analysis', in P. Craig and G. de Brca (eds.), The Evolution ofEULaw, 1999.
12 M.P. Maduro, 'How Constitutional Can the European Union Be? Reconciling
Intergovemrnmentalism with Constitutionalism in European Constitutionalism',
Paper presented at Altneuland: The Constitution of Europe in an American
Perspective, NYU-Princeton Conference, April 2004 <http://www.jeanmonnet
program.org/>.
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of the draft Constitutional Treaty drawn up by the Convention." For
example, in relation to procedural questions such as 'how, when and where
does constitutional development of the EU take place?', it is clear that
constitutional development occurs in a number of overlapping forums, such
as IGCs, national ratification processes for new treaties (which have included
some key national constitutional court judgments 4 ), and subsequent
interpretations and applications of the treaties by the Court of Justice and
other institutional actors. The question which this paper considers is how the
Convention has added to the process of the development of the acquis
through its working methods and through the management of the process by
key actors such as President Giscard d'Estaing.
In relation to the substantive content of the Constitutional Treaty, this paper
looks at the use of the composite constitutional acquis of the EU in the
context of the development of the text of a Constitutional Treaty. It examines
the ways in which the Convention's work on matters of substance was
structured by the complex heritage of the Union's constitutional acquis. The
paper shows that the Conventiofi has begun to force political actors at the
national and European levels to confront more directly than ever before some
key questions about what European constitutionalism already is, especially in
legal terms. In other words, there are key political questions about the
management and deployment of the legal sources of EU constitutionalism as
it exists under the current dispensation. Political actors must face questions
about the extent to which they might wish the realities of European
constitutionalism (such as the principle of the supremacy of EU law) to
remain hidden from public view in the future as in many respects they have
done hitherto. Can the delicate balance of the national and the supranational
dimensions of European integration (not to mention the subnational and
international inputs which it experiences) survive the sometimes harsh
scrutiny to which it was subjected within the confines of the Convention
process?
To set the scene for this discussion, it is important to reiterate some basic
premises about the evolution of the EU constitutional framework from the
inception of the first treaties until the present time. Even though it was not
until the Laeken Declaration in December 2001 that the European Council
first formally acknowledged the possibility of a 'Constitution' for the
European Union, the idea of analysing European integration in
constitutionalist terms has been well-established for decades. While the
practice has been particularly common amongst lawyers, it has also extended
to both students and practitioners of politics. 5 At the same time, however,
13 On the role of the acquis communautaire in relation to the governance of the EU
see A. Wiener, 'The Embedded Acquis Communautaire: Transmission Belt and
Prism of New Governance', (1998) 4 European Law Journal 294.
14 Most famously the German Federal Constitutional Court on the Treaty of
Maastricht and the German constitution: Brunner [1994] 1 CMLR 57.
'5 E.g. B. Kohler-Koch, 'A Constitution for Europe?, Working Paper of the
Mannheim Centre for European Social Research, 8/1999; C. Church and D.
Phinnemore, The Penguin Guide to the European Treaties, 2002 at p.15; W.
Wessels, 'Der Verfassungsvertrag in im Integrationstrend: Zusammenschau der
zentralen Ergebnisse', (2003) 26 Integration 284 ; J. Fischer, From Confederation
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the constitutional question remains highly contested in relation to the
innumerable sub-questions which it encapsulates, including the very purpose
and scope of a constitution for an entity such as the EU which is not formally
a state in the Westphalian sense, albeit that it is a polity which wields many
instruments and undertakes many tasks of a state-like nature. On the
contrary, it operates in some sort of ambiguous liminal space between states
and international organisations according to the conventional definitions of
national and international law, and it is widely regarded as deserving of
analysis above all as a sui generis entity which cannot easily be assimilated
to other known forms of political organisation. Above all, however, the very
ethic of European constitutionalism remains contested. 6
It is equally important to develop principled reference points for viewing
both the evolution of the Convention process and the substantive outcomes
which the Convention adopts. Elsewhere I have argued for the importance of
a critical assessment of the Convention process, in the light of principles of
responsible and inclusive constitutionalism. 7 This paper has a separate but
related objective to link the tensions which frame the procedural dimension
of the Convention to some of the key elements of its substantive debate.
With that objective in mind, the paper looks explicitly at the constitutional
acquis as the backdrop to the constitution-building process, as well as
contributing to reflection upon the novelty and sui generis nature of the
Convention process. That paradox of the rootedness of the Convention's
discussions in the constitutional acquis at the same time as it proposes
sometimes innovative solutions to apparently intractable problems will
remain, in my view, one of the most enduring features of the Convention
experience.
What is clear, therefore, is that constitution-building is both a legal and a
political process. This lies behind the preoccupation in this paper with
identifying and analysing the legal and political sources of the draft
European Constitutional Treaty.
The Procedural Dimension of Convention-Watching: The
'Building' of the Convention 'acquis'
The Convention on the Future of Europe comprised a body of 105 members,
plus the same number of alternates, including representatives of the national
governments, national parliaments, the European Parliament, and the
European Commission, plus sundry observers.' Representatives came from
both the fifteen Member States at the time, and the thirteen candidate
countries at the time (the ten states which acceded in May 2004, plus
Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey). It was led by a three person Presidency,
comprising Giscard d'Estaing, plus two Vice-Presidents (former Italian
to Federation - Thoughts on the Finality ofEuropean Integration, Speech given at
the Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany, 12 May 2000.
16 j. Shaw, 'Postnational constitutionalism in the European Union' (1999) 6 Journal
of European Public Policy 579.
J7 . Shaw, 'Process, Responsibility and Inclusion in EU Constitutionalism', (2003) 9
European Law Journal 45.
18 For an outline presentation of the Convention, see B. Crum, 'Politics and Power in
the European Convention', (2004) 24 Politics 1.
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Prime Minister Giuliano Amato and former Belgian Prime Minister Jean-Luc
Dehaene), plus a so-called Praesidium, comprising representatives of each of
the component groups of the Convention, which was charged with taking a
leading role in drafting. Secretariat services were ensured by a group led by
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, a former British diplomat (then Sir John Kerr),
with members seconded from both the EU institutions, and some of the
national civil services. At the very beginning, it was not wholly clear from
the so-called Laeken mandate what the role of the Convention was going to
be. This was somewhat ambivalent about what the Convention should
produce. Should it be merely a statement of the differences between the
negotiating parties, as occurred with the Reflection Group which preceded
the 1996-97 IGC and the Treaty of Amsterdam? Or should it be a group or
or even a single text responding to the needs of simplification and
legitimation articulated above all in the Laeken Declaration. Most agree that
the Laeken Declaration was sufficiently vague to produce a blank canvas on
which to paint a number of competing visions about both the purpose of the
Convention and the nature of the European integration process. 9
President Giscard d'Estaing's first speech to the opening session of the
Convention on 28 February 2002 asserted very clearly his belief in the
constitutive power and capacity of the Convention. It seems very likely that
he did not at the time anticipate that the Convention would conclude as it did
- with a 'full' draft Constitutional Treaty for the European Union - but that
did not stop him articulating ideas in his first speech in 'constitutional' terms.
Mentioning the word 'constitution' three times, he then concluded with a
powerful attempt to pre-empt much debate by declaring the aim of the
Convention thus: 0
"The Laeken Declaration leaves the Convention free to choose
between submitting options or making a single
recommendation. It would be contrary to the logic of our
approach to choose now. However, there is no doubt that, in
the eyes of the public, our recommendation would carry
considerable weight and authority if we could manage to
achieve broad consensus on a single proposal which we could
all present. If we were to reach consensus on this point, we
would thus open the way towards a Constitution for Europe. In
order to avoid any disagreement over semantics, let us agree
now to call it: a "constitutional treaty for Europe"." (emphasis
in the original)
This is a powerful presentation of the historical opportunity which Giscard
saw the Convention as presenting - an opportunity which he might have seen
in a certain sense as being for himself as an individual, but which he
effectively portrayed to the new Convention as a collective opportunity.
This sense of opportunity in turn spoke eloquently to the federalist majority
amongst the Convention members. Thus the constitutionalist endeavour
19 P. Craig, 'Constitutional Process and Reform in the EU: Nice, Laeken, the
Convention and the IGC', FCE 3/04 <www.whi-berlinde>.
20 V. Giscard d'Estaing, 'Introductory Speech to the Convention on the Future of
Europe', SN 1565/02, Brussels, 26 February 2002 (delivered 28 February 2002),
at p.11.
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became Giscard's main 'gift' to the Convention, which meant that despite
subsequent tensions, his leadership still retained a substantial element of
goodwill amongst the ordinary Convention members. It was from this point
on, however, that the Convention engaged in a form of constitution-building.
This section examines the procedural dimension of this constitutional
construction in terms of its political and legal sources.
Commentaries on the Convention have frequently pointed out that the
Convention was clearly more open, more transparent and more inclusive than
an IGC, that it 'decided' by 'consensus' and did not incorporate a set of
formal veto arrangements, and that it involved a wider range of elites, giving
an institutionalised voice to the European Parliament and to national
parliaments in the process.2 Procedural perspectives on the Convention
have focused on the ways in which the Convention has supplemented the
existing constitutionalisation processes of the European Union, for example,
by adding a 'pre-contractual' phase to the process whereby Member States
presently agree upon changes to the international treaties which remain the
formal construct of European integration22 and by introducing the notion of
consensus amongst elites as the basis for 'agreeing' a new constitutional
settlement. At the very least, the constitutional dialogues which shape the
EU have been immeasurably enriched by the complex constellations of
interest intermediation which the Convention comprised in its plenary
debates, working groups, and discussion circles, and in its draft texts and
amendments. Furthermore, in more or less open ways, the Convention and its
members remained in constant dialogue with external interests, such as
national parliaments, other European institutions, civil society and even
academia. The Convention experience has offered as a minimum a
suggestion of the promise of deliberation, and perhaps a great deal more than
that.2
3
In fact, formal constitution-building in the European Union has long been a
complex, multi-staged process, already involving an ever increasing range of
actors..24 While the first significant set of amendments to the EEC Treaty -
the Single European Act of 1986 - might have occurred away from the glare
of all but the most Europe-focussed publicity, subsequent cases of Treaty
amendment, although often not front-page affairs, have attracted much more
substantial media coverage, not least because of the referendum affairs in
21 See generally C. Closa, 'The Convention method and the transformation of EU
constitutional politics', in E.O. Eriksen, J.E. Fossum and A.J. Menndez (eds.),
Developing a Constitution for Europe, 2004; L. Hoffmann, 'The Convention on
the Future of Europe: Thoughts on the Convention-Model', in J. Shaw, P.
Magnette, L. Hoffmann and A. Verges, The Convention on the Future of Europe:
Working towards an EU Constitution, 2003; L. Hoffmann and A. Verges Bausili,
'The reform of Treaty revision procedures: the Convention on the Future of
Europe', in T. BOrzel and R. Cichowski (eds.), State of the European Union,
Volume 6: Law, Politics and Society, 2003.
22 B. de Witte, 'The Closest Thing to a Constitutional Conversation in Europe: the
Semi-Permanent Treaty Revision Process', in P. Beaumont, C. Lyons and N.
Walker (eds), Convergence and Divergence in European Public Law, 2003, pp.39-
57.
23 P. Magnette, 'Deliberation or bargaining? Coping with constitutional conflicts in
the Convention on the Future of Europe', in Eriksen et al, above n.21.
24 Closa, above nl21.
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Denmark (Maastricht), France (Maastricht) and Ireland (Nice). As things
stand, the Convention has added a further pre-contractual stage to the
process; the convening of a Convention does not - and cannot, at least until
the rules of the game are themselves formally changed by Treaty amendment
- formally pre-empt or replace the Intergovernmental Conference as the site
within which formal commitments are made between the Member States.
The latter remain the legal 'Masters of the Treaty', and are likely to do so for
the foreseeable future.
On the other hand, so far as the Member States were required by the
Convention to engage in the endeavour to find compromise and consensus
positions on key questions about the missions, functions, values and
operating procedures and practices of the European Union which have
historically been fudged or swept to the sidelines as posing insoluble
problems, they did so in a very different framework to that of an
intergovernmental conference. It is significant that in some measure at least,
the Convention constituted a shift from the exchange of concessions and
compromises to the exchange of reasons amongst participants.25 To a certain
extent, the Member States found themselves 'locked in' by their participation
in the Convention process. In part, they reacted to that by seeking to make
the Convention more like an IGC, as more and more states nominated
foreign ministers or other cabinet rank ministers to be their representatives
on the Convention as its work progressed. On the other hand, the change in
the environment partially enabled the Convention - and the Member States
in particular - to break away from certain taboos which have constrained
state behaviour within IGCs when discussing historical blocking points such
as institutional reform and the question of the future of the institutional
system designed in the 1950s for a 'Community' of Six, rather than a twenty-
first century 'Union' of Twenty-Five+.
One clearly important innovation, for example, which created a very
different feel to the Convention as compared to the IGC was the presence of
national opposition parties through the medium of national parliamentary
representatives and European parliamentary representatives, sitting in the
same debating chamber and round the same negotiating table as national
governmental representatives. This in some respects broke down the sense
of the unitary 'national' interest as represented by national governments
which had often stifled the development of intergovernmental negotiations
and ensured that they have predictably remained bargaining rather than
deliberation scenarios. Indeed, this change seemed to offer the promise of
deliberation - if not yet quite the reality, or so the consensus of reports from
professional Convention-watchers generally has seemed to indicate.26 In
25 See F. Deloche-Gaudez, 'Le Secretariat de la Convention Europenne: un acteur
26 influent', (2004) Politique Euro1eenne, no. 13, Spring 2004, 43 at p.44.
Attempts to capture more of this promise of deliberation are evident in mid-stream
changes to how the Convention works introduced by the Praesidium, such as the
innovation of more frequent plenary meetings, the reduction in speaking time, and
the decision to allow spontaneous interventions through the raising of 'blue cards',
all designed to reduce the tendency of plenary to be a sequence of 'soap-box'
speeches: see 'Convention faces change of philosophy test', 27 February 2003
<www.euobserver.com>. See also generally P. Norman, The Accidental
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truth, over the years many competing stories will be written about how and
why the Convention reached the conclusions that it did.
From the perspective of legal analysis, it is important to stick quite closely to
the available documentation, in order to ground the discussion. One of the
most important frameworks for 'knowing' about the Convention was its
website." From the perspective of wider communication with publics, this
website was wholly inadequate. Within a very few months of the
Convention's inception, there was already an overwhelming body of written
material on its website. This effectively precluded the casual visitor to the
site from gaining anything more than a very superficial review of what the
Convention was and did from the very brief and relatively uninformative
introductory materials which the website provided. The website did not
explain for the general user how and why the Convention was in fact
working towards a new Constitutional Treaty, making reference briefly to
some of the questions in the Laeken Declaration, but omitting any form of
articulation of how the Convention agenda and approach shifted in its early
months into the constitutional register.28 During the lifetime of the
Convention, clicking on the heading 'Draft Constitutional Treaty' on the
website merely brought up the highly impenetrable skeleton put forward by
the Praesidium in October 2002,29 the rafts of draft articles which followed
after January 2003, and the multitudes of amendments put forward by
Convention members.3" These were followed, as the texts were gradually put
together, by successive Praesidium re-drafts, such that by the end of the
hectic few final weeks it would only have been clear to a close observer of
the events and of changes on the website exactly what was the final text of
the four parts of the Constitutional Treaty 'approved' in Plenary on 13 June
and 18 July 2003.31 That is the negative side of the Convention and its
website, which was quickly turned into a tool which would be useful only to
those staying very close to the Convention debate. The positive side of the
website lies in that very same mass of material which is impenetrable to the
casual visitor, but which can in fact reveal to those who have followed the
process from the beginning much of the complexity and richness of the
constitution-building process, and the different elements of which it is
composed.
Constitution. The Story of the European Convention, 2003; A. Dauvergne,
L "Europe en Otage? Histoire secrbte de la Convention, 2004.27 <http://european-convention.eu.intV>.
28 Those with a more casual or occasional interest would have needed to turn to
websites such as the Federal Trust EU Constitution Project
<www.fedtrust.co.uk/eu constitution> which observed the Convention from the
outside.
29 CONV 369/02 of 28 October 2002.
30 See <http://european-convention.eu.intlamendemTrait.asp?lang=EN>.
31 The most important documents were CONV 797/1/03 REV 1, Text of Part I and
Part H of the Constitution, 12 June 2003, CONV 802/03, Draft Constitution.
Volume 11, 12 June 2003 and finally, after the July reconvening of the Convention,
CONV 850/03, 18 July 2003.
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This process has involved the creation and deployment for developmental
purposes of the Convention's own acquis,32 based on deliberations in
working groups and plenary, the prefatory, summative and drafting work of
the Secretariat including the preparation of working documents and
questionnaires, reports, summaries of meetings and draft articles, and the
discussions and resolutions of the Praesidium. Not all of these processes and
outcomes were equally public. Notably the Praesidium always deliberated
behind closed doors, and - notwithstanding objections33 - did not publish
minutes of its meetings, at least not until after the conclusion of the
Convention.34 Moreover, these 'minutes' were deliberately drafted in order
not to be revelatory. It was obvious from the beginning of the Convention's
work that notwithstanding their non-publication that they were in practice
being 'circulated' by Praesidium members to their 'composants' (i.e. the
groups they worked within, such as the group of MEPs, or national members
of Parliament, or representatives of national governments) as well as to
political family colleagues. The deliberately bland nature of the minutes as
drafted was chosen in order to 'safeguard Praesidium decision-making
capability', 35 and indeed it was apparent that the European Ombudsman
sympathised with this political imperative when the refusal to publish the
minutes during the course of the Convention's work was referred to him in
early 2003.36
Working Group meetings, furthermore, were generally not open to public
observation, whereas plenary meetings were not only public and
televised/webcast (and fully linguistically accessible because of simultaneous
interpretation), but were also recorded verbatim in transcripts on the
European Parliament website, initially in the original language of each
statement, but ultimately to be made available in all official languages.
The analysis of Secretariat documentation - much of which was passed via
the Praesidium for approval and adopted as Praesidium documentation,
sometimes with, and sometimes without amendment - is perhaps the most
illuminating exercise in excavating the emergence of the Convention's
acquis.37 Theoretically, the Secretariat could have provided the bridge
between the Convention and some of the most effective institutional players
in the EU, namely the secretariats and legal services of the Council and the
32 A term used by Convention Vice-Chairman Jean-Luc Dehaene, as quoted in B.
Crum, 'Towards Finality: A Preliminary Assessment of the Achievements of the
3 European Convention', ARENA Working Paper WP 03/4 <www.arena.uio.no>.
Objections have come notably from Convention members in political factions
which are not represented in the Praesidium, such as the Green/EFA working
collaboration on the Convention and the GUE/NGL group. In May 2003 the
Praesidium decided that after the conclusion of the Convention's work, its
documents should be made publicly available via the website.
3 'Praesidium documents' at <http://european-convention.eu.int>.
3 Private communication from a senior official within the Secretariat.
3 Decision of the European Ombudsman on complaint 1795/2002/IJH as it relates to
the European Convention at<http://www.euro-ombudsman.etint.
3 See generally on the Secretariat as an 'influential actor', Deloche-Gaudez, above
n.25. Providing a methodology for the study of Secretariats, especially those
within IGCs, see generally D. Beach, 'The unseen hand in treaty reform
negotiations: the role and influence of the Council Secretariat', (2004) 11 Journal
of European Public Policy 408.
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Commission, which have an unparalleled expertise in understanding the
present state of EU law as well as a background as repeat players in IGCs
over the years. This was certainly true so far as many of members of the
Convention Secretariat were drawn from the services of the Council and the
Commission, as well as that of the European Parliament and a number of
national diplomatic services. In practice, the Convention Secretariat acted in
large measure in isolation. Such an independent and autonomous Secretariat
was not foreseen in the Laeken Declaration, but in practice the Council
Secretariat wanted to keep itself rather separate, in view of the fact that it
would later be providing secretarial services to the IGC. In addition,
President Giscard d'Estaing wanted to reinforce the autonomy of the
Convention and sought an autonomous Secretariat, with many handpicked
members given his personal seal of approval.38 The Commission's
interventions in the Convention's work were, as a general rule, hamstrung
greatly by the lack of an effective political engagement on the part of the
Commission with the Convention. This meant, for example, that neither the
Commission Legal Service, nor any of the other expert teams working on the
Convention, such as those assisting Commission President Prodi, or
Convention members Commissioners Barnier and Vitorino were able to
make the first move in presenting key proposals to the Convention. They
were restricted to the reactive role of commentator, and this reflected back
once again on the general political weakness of the Commission at the
present time. It goes without saying that the public relations debacle of the
presentation of the so-called Penelope project, intended to demonstrate the
legal feasibility of the Commission's political project for the EU,39 greatly
harmed the effectiveness of the Commission as an influential actor within the
Convention.
The Convention Secretariat was certainly no mere 'administrator' of the
Convention. It played an essential role in setting out the richness and variety
of the EU's existing constitutional acquis by preparing and issuing
documentation notes on issues such as the present system of competence
distribution and allocation, the legal instruments of the EU, the nature of the
open method of coordination, the state of play in external action and justice
and home affairs, the role of national parliaments and the institutions of the
EU, and on the regional and local dimension of EU governance. While
largely descriptive, these papers had the capacity also to shape debate
because of their effective command of the current status quo. Allied to this,
the Secretariat more directly shaped debate by preparing papers on questions
such as the possibilities of simplification as envisaged by the Declaration on
the Future of the Union and the Laeken Declaration.4 In that sense, the
38 Deloche-Gaudez, above n.25 at p.45 et seq.
39 European Commission, 'Feasibility Study: Contribution to a Preliminary Draft
Constitution of the Europena Union', 4 December 2002 (presented on 5 December
2002), Working Document <http://europa.eu.int/futururn/docinstconm2002_
en.htm>.
40 See CONV 250/02 Simplification of the Treaties and Drawing up of a
Constitutional Treaty, 10 September 2002. It was unsurprising that the Secretariat
had expertise on the specific question of simplification, because amongst its
members was Hervd Bribosia, whose previous work included acting as Rapporteur
on the European University Institute's much quoted pre-Nice project on
simplification of the treaties, which was sponsored by the European Commission:
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Secretariat contributed directly to innovation as well as to explaining the
relevance of the EU's constitutional acquis to the Convention's own work.
Interestingly, the method chosen by the Secretary General Sir John Kerr for
the elaboration of these papers, which involved both small teams of drafters
and roundrobin brainstorming sessions at which the entire Secretariat was
able to make an input into papers, strengthened the cohesiveness of that
organisation, which became more and more influential as the Convention
drew to a close. Kerr's team-building skills surprised many people, who
were not - in contrast - surprised by his quick mastery of the many complex
substantive dossiers involved in the Convention project, even though he had
not been directly involved in European affairs since 1995."
Inevitably, of course, the Secretariat provided the background expertise for
the preparation of crucial documents such as the mandates of the working
groups and (in almost all cases) the working group draft reports, under the
political control of the Praesidium and the Chairs of the respective working
groups who were in turn drawn from the Praesidium. Florence Deloche-
Gaudez cites its expertise as one of its key resources.42 Likewise, the
Secretariat provided substantial input for crucial documents such as the
October skeleton for a new Constitutional Treaty43 and the subsequent
tranches of draft articles and successive redrafts.' There can be little doubt
that the Secretariat was crucial to the drafting of all key documents, with the
exception of the draft Preamble which Giscard is thought to have worked on
alone. Other documents, such as the initial skeleton published in October
2002,45 were probably largely produced by Giscard and the Secretary
General, working together. The lack of wider consultation might explain a
curiosity such as the idea of dual citizenship (European/national) which was
not a derivation from the existing treaties, which mysteriously appeared in
the October 2002 draft, but which disappeared from a later February 2003
draft in favour of a return to a text which reproduced the existing EC/EU
Treaties. 6 What was clear was the Secretariat's role in preparing reports on
reactions to the draft articles and beginning the task of collating the huge
number of amendments proposed, especially to the initial foundational
articles of the draft Treaty, a daunting exercise in the management of
information.
The Secretariat was also responsible for preparing summaries of plenary
meetings and working group meetings, although these were apparently
Robert Schuman Centre, 2000. For commentary, see K. Feus (ed), A Simplified
Treaty for the European Union?, London.
41 Deloche-Gaudez, above n.25 at p.61 and p.63. After service as the UK's
Permanent Representative in Brussels, up to 1995, he was subsequently UK
Ambassador to the United States of America and then finally Permanent Under-
Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office before taking
retirement.
42 Deloche-Gaudez, above n.25 at pp.61-62.
43 See above n.29.
4 These documents are too many to list separately. For guidance on how the separate
tranches of articles built up into the final conclusions of the Convention see
<http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/constit draftconsttreaty.htm>.
"5 CONV 369/02, above n.29, Article 5.
46 CONV 528/03, 16 February 2003 (Articles 1-16), Article 7.
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drawn up under the sole authority of the Secretary General, rather than the
Praesidium, as it was not felt desirable politically by the majority of the
Praesidium to have such records. These latter summaries did not always
receive unanimous support from 'embedded' Convention watchers as
faithfully representing the debate. From time to time, the 'watchers' would
have seen a particular point receiving very strong support from individual
Convention members, where the meeting summary represented this as
merely involving 'a number of Convention members'. However, there is
nothing surprising in this, as the role of the minute taker in a meeting has
since time immemorial offered the opportunity to control the agenda as well
as to present the outcomes of deliberations in a particular light.
That comment leads directly to the final aspect of process which needs to be
highlighted in this section of the paper, namely the management of the whole
process of constitution-building. When the Member States agreed, in the
Laeken Declaration, to the establishment of the Convention, one of the
'checks' which they placed upon its capacity to produce unintended, and
perhaps unwanted, outcomes was the nomination of ex-French president
Giscard d'Estaing to chair the Convention, bearing in mind that he was a
man known to have a capacity for strong leadership, a reputation for
independence, but perhaps most crucially a proven background of support for
a view of European integration which preserved a strong role for the states.47
Doubtless many were surprised when Giscard so quickly seized the
opportunity to make his distinctive mark by expressing his immediate
preference for the option of producing a single report from the Convention,
not a series of options, a report which would take the form of a
Constitutional Treaty. Moreover, Giscard showed himself to be markedly
undeterred by the complexity problem - namely that the choice for a
Constitutional Treaty itself begged the question of 'fit' and coherence with
what needs to be carried over from the old Treaties in terms of institutional
provisions, legal bases, and policy frameworks, and what needs to be decided
new from scratch.' To that end, he instituted the group of legal experts from
the European Union institutions, which was charged with leading the way
towards the drafting of what eventually became Part III of the Constitutional
Treaty.49 Indeed, one could surmise that the impact and effect of Giscard
47 See, for example, his advocacy of a cautious approach to enlargement, in the post-
euro era: V. Giscard d'Estaing and H. Schmidt, 'Time to Slow Down and
Consolidate Around "Euro-Europe"', International Herald Tribune, 11 April
2000.
48 It could be argued, indeed, that Giscard kept the members of the Convention busy
with the constitution-building aspects of its work in order to distract them from
spending sixteen months discussing (falling out over?) the revisions to the
institutional set-up inherited from the Treaty of Rome and tinkered with repeatedly
in successive treaties, which were always going to be the most intractable
problems facing the Convention and the ones least likely to be solved by the
application of the deliberative aspects of the Convention-method. In fact, of
course, there were many discussions of the institutional questions - but they were
largely kept off the official agendas of the Working Groups, Discussion Circles
and Plenary meetings. This was doubtless not an accident.
9 CONV 529/03 of 6 February 2003 Remit of the group of experts nominated by the
Legal Services. The group's work very substantially influenced the provisions of
Part III of the Treaty when it was first issued: CONV 725/03, 27 May 2003.
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within the Convention and its work could be said to be one of the unintended
and unexpected consequences of the process, rather than one of the checking
factors serving the interests of Member States, presumed at the outset to be
unwilling to countenance too dramatic a shift from the status quo. At the
same time, Giscard showed himself to be sensitive to the core concerns of
the Member States, ensuring key national representation in the Secretariat
(especially in the person of the British Secretary General, Sir John Kerr), and
engaging in some controversial bilateral contacts with national capitals.
Giscard showed himself to be simultaneously both controlling and flexible in
relation to the process of compiling the Treaty.' A form of dirigisme was
probably the leitmotiv of Giscard's overall orientation towards the
Convention. Control stemmed above all from the insistence on issuing
separate tranches of articles as these were approved by the Praesidium. This
made it more difficult for those Convention members who were not on the
Praesidium and who therefore had relatively little sense of the overall
enterprise to address their comments to what they anticipated might be the
final structure of the Constitutional Treaty, other than by relying on the
original framework issued in October 2002. Furthermore, to the
considerable disadvantage of national parliamentary members of the
Convention who found it particularly difficult to fulfil their mandate to stay
in touch with the views of their constituencies, very short deadlines were
consistently given for submitting amendments and reactions to each fresh
tranche of draft articles.
There is also evidence from plenary debates that Giscard did try to control
some of the most influential voices on the Convention - that is, those who
were on the Praesidium and who were therefore privy to the early drafts of
Treaty articles and to the Praesidium's own discussions about the direction
the new Constitutional Treaty should take - by using some form of collective
'cabinet responsibility' to muzzle those who had argued their case for a
different view, but who had lost out, in the Praesidium's private meetings.
Thus, at least up to the point when the Praesidium began to assert its
independent authority in relation to the question of institutions," there was
no substantial evidence of Praesidium debates being replayed in public in the
plenary. Those who had lost the debate in the Praesidium found it harder
although not impossible to bring the same arguments before the plenary. In
fact, only the other two members of the three person Presidency, Vice
Presidents Jean-Luc Dehaene and Guiliano Amato, along with Klaus Hnsch
of the European Parliament, showed much inclination to stick very closely to
collective 'cabinet responsibility'. On the hand, the Commission, with its
numerically small representation (both full members are also members of the
Praesidium), always found it a little difficult to be really effective in both
Praesidium and Plenary, since its alternate members were not politicians of
stature but rather senior officials.
Furthermore, control manifested itself in Giscard's own oral summaries of
plenary debates at-the conclusion of individual Convention sessions and in
1
50 For a sustained narrative of the Convention 'story', which builds in the key role of
Giscard throughout the process, see generally Norman, above n.26.
51 See the original draft on institutions, Title IV of Part I, CONV 691/03, 23 April
2003.
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his presentations from time to time of the next steps which the Convention
should take to advance its mandate, as well as in the way in which he acted
politically outside the confines of the Convention, especially by engaging in
a bilateral way with certain key Member States, thus sending out certain
strong political messages about who matters and who does not.
As to flexibility, this was demonstrated by the willingness to countenance the
creation of new sub-groups of Convention members to deal with problems
and issues as they arose, whether the Working Group on Social Europe
which was set up right at the end of the Working Group phase in response to
a bottom-up movement of Convention members, or the discussion circles on
specific matters such as the Court of Justice,52 budgetary matters and latterly
the question of taxation. It was also evident from Giscard's responsiveness
to changing political contexts, such as his willingness to 'pull' the periodic
report which he had hitherto delivered to each European Council meeting,
when faced with the risk of being almost completely squeezed out of the
agenda at the Spring 2003 European Council in the wake of the UN Security
Council debacle and the launch of the US/UK military action in Iraq. At the
same time, this potential 'loss of face' was quickly counterbalanced by an
attempt to persuade the Greek Presidency to implement a plan for the
European Council to meet specifically to deal with Convention matters on 30
June 2003. Eventually that plan came to naught. However, Giscard sought
successfully to place the Convention on the agenda of the European Council
meeting in Athens in April 2003, which had been convened for the specific
purpose of signing the Accession Treaties for the new Member States. This
gave Giscard a visible and public role on this historic occasion.
What was particularly clear throughout the whole process was that there
remained a signal lack of clarity about what the final product would look
like. Literally hundreds of amendments were proposed by ordinary
Convention members to each set of draft provisions put forward by the
Praesidium, and only a proportion of these could be discussed at each
plenary meeting. Thereafter, the Praesidium would 'think again', but the
mass of Convention members were left largely in the dark as to what this
might involve. Furthermore, the release of the draft provisions on the
institutions was delayed to such an extent - they finally appeared to a great
furore on 23 April 2003 - that it was hard to say how the whole product
could be seen as positioned on the traditional inter-
governmental/supranational continuum, which is so often measured in terms
52 The approach to the Court of Justice taken in the Convention could be - and
doubtless will be - severely criticised for its failure to take seriously fundamental
questions about judicial architecture and judicial resources. So far as the Court -
institutionally - would be affected by the changes proposed in the draft
Constitution, this concerns largely mere tinkering at the margins. On the other
hand, it is conceivable that the changes - if and when instrumentalised in a new
Treaty entering into force upon ratification - could lead to additional demands
upon the Court, especially in relation to fundamental rights, following the
incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into the Constitution, as Part
II. Speculation to that effect can be found in a rather sensationalised article in the
Economist, 27 January 2004, entitled 'Government by Judges?'. It quotes Irish
Court of Justice Fidelma Macken as saying it would be 'foolish' to assume that the
Charter will have no impact on the Court's case law.
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of certain key questions about institutional powers and interinstitutional
relationships. This tended to fuel the conspiracy theorists who suggested that
the final proposed Constitutional Treaty would magically appear in large
measure from Giscard's back pocket, or indeed from his top hat, in the
manner of the magician's proverbial rabbit, although in the event that fear
was largely unfounded. Alternatively, of course, a number suggested that the
magic might be provided by Sir John Kerr, the Secretary General. However,
a number of changes to the provisions introduced in the last hectic days and
hours of the Convention did not appear to have come in any meaningful way
out of the Convention's deliberations, such as the principle of 'citizens'
initiatives', tacked onto what was finally agreed by the IGC as Article I-
47(4) CT. Article 1-47 deals with the principle of participatory democracy.
Furthermore, some of those involved in the Convention regularly expressed
displeasure at finding what they believed to be unwarranted departures in the
articles issued by the Praesidium from what they perceived to be the 'results'
of the Convention's work so far, embodied in its plenary discussions and its
working group reports especially. 3  But so much was said within the
Convention, with so many different meanings and purposes, that gleaning a
single consensus from these expressions of view was inevitably a
judgemental exercise. To that extent, one person's consensus is another's
dissensus, as the contested summaries of Convention meetings made clear.
For the purposes of the argument in this paper what is most important is that
lack of clarity about the overall output can lead to competing and contesting
positions being advanced about the extent to which the final product will or
will not be innovatory compared to the current state of European
constitutional law. For example, Jean-Luc Dehaene, Vice-President of the
Convention, called it 'evolution not revolution',54 stressing that there will be
much that is familiar to cognoscenti of the existing Treaties in whatever is
eventually proposed by the Convention. UK Government representative
Peter Hain called it a 'tidying up' exercise. Usefully, for observers of the
Convention, the reports on the separate tranches of articles and key Working
Group Reports which were produced in quick succession in Spring 2003 by
the UK House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union55 stressed
in each case 'what was new' and 'what was old', and above all what was
omitted in the new text from what was old. An example of this is the
reference to 'ever closer union amongst the peoples of Europe' which was
dropped from the Praesidium's draft of what were then Articles 1-16 of the
draft Constitutional Treaty.'
53 E.g. P. Ham, 'The Future of Europe: A Union of Sovereign States', Speech,
Adjournment Debate, Westminster Hall, London, 20 March 2003; see also the
interventions by Alain Lamassoure and others at the discussion of the Report of
Working Group on Complementary Competences at the plenary of 7-8 November
2002 <http://european-convention.eu.int>.
5" J.L. Dehaene, 'Towards a Constitutional Treaty for the European Union', Speech
to Kings College London, Centre for European Law, 11 February 2003, at p.6.
55 See the numerous reports available at <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/ld/ldeucom.htm>.
56 CONV 528/03, above n.46. 'he term 'ever closer union' originated in the
Preamble to the EEC Treaty, and was taken up in Article I of the Treaty on
European Union. The preamble to the Constitutional Treaty picks this phrase up in
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It is this focus on the new/old combination of constitutional acquis refracted
into the new Constitutional Treaty via the prism of the Convention's
deliberations, and the creation of the sense of an autonomous Convention
acquis, which leads from the focus on the Convention as process into a
reflection upon questions of constitutional substance. This combination of
new and old reflected legal and political choices alike. The shift to a focus
on substance is the last step in this paper's endeavour to provide a close
description of how the Convention is simultaneously both rooted in the 'old'
constitutional framework of the EU, as well as constantly toying with
innovations and new ideas. This section will concentrate upon just a small
number of substantive issues which taxed the Convention, namely the
treatment of fundamental rights in the Constitutional Treaty, the issues of
sovereignty and supremacy in relations between EU law and national law
and between the EU and the Member States, and the questions of
competence division and exercise.
The Substantive Dimension of Convention-Watching: Working
Towards a European Constitution?
Rights; supremacy/sovereignty; competences. These are three key issues
which underpin the most sensitive normative aspects of the draft
Constitutional Treaty agreed upon by the Convention in June and July 2003.
They are issues which go to the heart of the question: what is the European
Union and what functions ought it to serve? Each is examined in turn, the
point being less to critique the approach taken by the Convention itself, but
rather to show how the Convention had to face up to the delicate task of
blending innovation and acquis, especially in so far as it could not (or should
not) ignore the considerable extent to which the EU as it stands, at least as a
proto-constitutional order, is a judicial creation. They also go to the heart of
the fear that a formal constitutional settlement risks disturbing the delicate
balance which underpins the current constitutional framework." However,
the blending of the past and the future is not an innovation of the Convention
and the IGC in relation to treaty reform. Historically the use of so-called
rendez-vous and passerelle clauses in successive treaty amendments has
linked the past and the future. A rendez-vous clause is one which explicitly
picks up on an area where reform is acknowledged to be incomplete. This
was clearly the case in relation to the Treaty of Amsterdam and institutional
reform aimed at enlargement. A rendez-vous clause calls for the reconvening
of an IGC to carry on the work of reform, hoping that perhaps at a later stage
political conditions will be more conducive to agreement.58 A passerelle
clause, of which there are a number in the Constitutional Treaty, especially
in relation to shifts from unanimity to qualified majority voting, allow in
some respects by referring the peoples of Europe being 'united ever more closely':
CIG 87/04, above n.3
57 See J.H.H. Weiler (2002), 'A Constitution for Europe? Some Hard Choices',
Journal of Common Market Studies, 40/4, pp563-580; for a reply, reluctantly
accepting the value of a formal written Constitution, see M.P. Maduro, 'Is There
Europe for a Constitution?' in J.HH. Weiler, I. Begg and J. Peterson (eds.),
Integration in an Expanding European Union: Reassessing the Fundamentals,
2003.
E.g. Protocol on Enlargement attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam.
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effect a lighter weight process for reforming the EU decision-making
processes, by allowing the Council to decide, by unanimity, for example, to
move to qualified majority voting. In practice, no passerelle clauses have
ever been used, but they are important symbolic elements of the continuous
process of treaty reform.
a) Bill of Rights
It is hard to imagine a modem liberal polity with constitutional pretensions
without some form of (binding) bill of rights as a definitive statement of
social and civic values (as opposed to ad hoc protection of fundamental
rights via the more elastic concept of general principles of law which is the
status quo under EU law at present).59 How should the Constitutional Treaty
take up this challenge? In that context, what should be done with the pre-
existing but currently non-binding Charter of Fundamental Rights for the
EU?
Given the United Kingdom's signal awkwardness in the context of the
drafting of the Charter during the course of 2000, and its double insistence
on both the inclusion of certain 'horizontal' clauses which would limit the
scope and effect of the Charter if it were legally binding and the apparently
unconditional rejection of the possibility of the Charter as drafted ever being
adopted as a legally binding instrument, the position taken by the UK in the
course of the deliberations of the Working Group on the legal status of the
Charter was widely thought of as an important breakthrough.6o While
insisting again on the further strengthening of the horizontal clauses, the UK
representatives did not as such dissent from a 'consensus' view that the
Charter ought to be incorporated as legally binding into the Constitutional
Treaty, a view which was widely shared in plenary debates on this question.
In the event, that was the approach adopted by the Convention,6" and
likewise although the UK continued to formally reserve its position on this
question until the very end, the IGC settled upon incorporating the Charter as
Part II of the Constitutional Treaty. Far from settling all the relevant issues,
however, the effect of this changed political determination on the part of a
previously dissenting Member State was to open more questions than it
answered, and indeed not all of the questions can be answered just by
59 This does not appear to be the view of the UK Government, as demonstrated by its
response to the 6th Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on the
European Union, Session 2002-2003, which considered The Future Status of the
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In response to the Committee's comment that
,any new constitution for the Union should be accompanied by a bill of rights', the
Government responded that it 'does not accept that any new constitution has to
have a bill of rights', preferring instead - it would appear - the 'respectable
argument' that the status quo system of fundamental rights protection was
sufficient (House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, 27h Report,
Session 2002-2003). In the end, the UK did not or perhaps could not prevent the
Charter being formally included in the draft Constitutional Treaty approved by the
Convention, although that does not finally settle the question, given that the matter
then went before the IGC.
60 Final Report of the Working Group, CONV 354/02,22 October 2002.
61 See CONV 726/03, 26 June 2003, Draft of Part II with comments.
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looking at the texts finally approved by the Convention in June 2003, and
adopted in large measure in the same form by the IGC.62
A first line of enquiry concerned the nature of the invocation of the Charter
as a legally binding part of the new constitutional framework. Was it best to
incorporate the Charter 'by reference', while leaving it in a separate
document indirectly given legal force? Or should it be incorporated as an
integral and explicit part of the text of the Constitutional Treaty? Once the
latter solution was adopted, a further question arose: where in the
Constitutional Treaty did it belong? At the beginning, before the general
principles of the Union itself are articulated? Somewhere in the middle of
Part I of the Constitutional Treaty, which sets out the constitutional
framework of the Union? In a separate Part II or Part III of the Treaty, where
its separateness would not break up the flow of the rest of the constitutional
text? Or in an Annex or Protocol to the Constitutional Treaty, where it
risked looking somehow downgraded in relation to the rest of the
constitutional documentation. One factor was very important to the location
debate. While the Charter was drafted on an 'as if' presumption, which
reflected an intention to draft a text which was capable of being given legal
force without further alteration, it was also drafted on the assumption that it
was a separate text to the Union treaties. Thus its final provisions or
horizontal clauses not only contained the infamous attempts to ensure that
the Charter could not be interpreted as extending the scope of Union
competence and that its effects vis-6-vis the Member States would be limited
(see especially Article 51 of the Charter as currently drafted63), but also
provisions which protected the integrity of legal fundamental rights
protection under national law, Union law and international law, for the
benefit of individuals (see especially Article 53 of the Charter). Once the
Convention resolved to incorporate the Charter as part of the Constitutional
Treaty largely unamended, so that the problem of overlap would be bound to
continue with the other provisions of the Constitutional Treaty, then it
needed certainly to address the issues which framed the intentions of those
who drafted the Charter of Rights before it decided upon the question of
location.
However, even once it was resolved that the Charter should be formally
incorporated as Part II of the Constitutional Treaty, there remained some key
questions about the relationship between the Charter and other sources of
fundamental rights.' The distinctive character of the Union's hitherto judge-
62 See generally de G. de Btirca, 'Fundamental Rights and Citizenship', in B. de
Witte, 2003, Ten Reflections on the Constitutional Treatyfor Europe, 2003, pp1 1-
44; M. Brand (2003), 'Towards the Definitive Status of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union: Political Document or Legally
Binding Text?' (2003) 4 German Law Journal 395
<www.germanlawjoumal.com>; E. Vranes, 'The Final Clauses of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights - Stumbling Blocks for the First and Second Convention',
European Integration OnLine Papers, 2003-007 <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2003-
007a.htm>; Dutheil de la Rochre, above n.2.
63 OJ 2000 C364/1.
64 See generally, I. Pemice, 'Integrating the Charter of Fundamental Rights into the
Constitution of the European Union: Practical and Theoretical Propositions',
(2003) 10 Columbia Journal of European Law 5; 1. Pernice and R. Kanitz,
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led system of enforcement of fundamental rights, which has been based on
Article 220 EC ('the Court shall ensure that the law is observed') and Article
6(2) TEU has been its dynamic and fluid character. This case law involves
the Court referring as necessary to a substantial variety of possible sources of
'Community fundamental rights', including national constitutional traditions
and different international law instruments, including but not confined to the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
('ECHR'). The Court has frequently referred to other fundamental rights
sources such as the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and
the European Social Charter in its case law. That acquis is to be carried
forward into the post-Constitution era, as the Charter will not become an
exclusive source of the Union's fundamental rights, although the privileged
position of the ECHR will continue for a number of reasons. First, the
reference to the ECHR is preserved in what will be Article 1-9(3) CT, which
effectively transcribes the old Article 6(2) TEU into the Constitutional
Treaty. In the longer term, the Court of Justice may have to consider any
possible dissonances between the legal force of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights and the continuing recognition of fundamental rights as general
principles of law within the EU legal order (Article 1-9(3) CT). Second,
Article 11-112(3) CT contains the unchanged text of Article 52(3) of the
Charter and this requires the meaning and scope of Charter rights which
correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR to be 'the same as those laid
down by the' ECHR. Finally, considerable complexity regarding the legal
structures of rights protection in the future, should the Union succeed in the
project promised in Article 1-9(2) CT that it 'shall seek' accession to the
ECHR. This is a proposal long supported by the influential House of Lords
Select Committee on the European Union, amongst other voices.65 Overall,
Article 1-9 CT could be said to convey an enthusiasm of purpose, aiming at
the protection of fundamental rights, rather than an economy of expression.
Finally, there is the sticky question of the content of the Charter and its
relationship to the rest of EU law. There are substantial areas of overlap
between the Charter and other provisions of EU law that have been included
in the Constitutional Treaty, whether in Part I on general principles and
constitutional structure, or in Part III on policies. Adjustment of the two sets
of provisions to each other could have assisted the project of ensuring
harmony of interpretation, but fell foul, in essence, of the desire not to
disturb the text of the Charter.6 Article 11-112(2) CT, picking up verbatim
Article 52(2) of the Charter, recognises the overlap issue, by requiring that
rights recognised by the Charter which are based on EU law are exercised in
accordance with the conditions of the EU treaties. This seems to suggest that
two sets of provisions could co-exist comfortably. Even so, there is likely to
be a substantial task for the Court of Justice to determine the scope and
effects of rights provisions especially where there is overlap between the
'Fundamental Rights and Multilevel Constitutionalism in Europe', WHI Paper
7/04 <http://www.rewi. hu-berlin.de/WHI/english/>.65 This was the view taken by the HIL Selection Committee in its report on the
Charter: EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 8" Report, 1999-2000, HIL Paper 67.
It repeats the view in a more recent report: The Future Status of the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights, 6" Report, 2002-2003, HIL Paper 48.
6 de Brca, above n.62, at p.29 et seq.
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Charter and the other sections of the Constitutional Treaty. Its task here will
be to create synergies between the wider and already embedded acquis which
it has developed in concordance with the existing treaties, and the acquis of
the Convention and the new constitutional settlement. In a trenchant critique
of problems raised by the juxtaposition of the Charter and the rest of the
Constitutional Treaty, Erich Vranes has argued that 'existing doubts are
reinforced as to whether the much-discussed "Convention method" really
allows an appropriate treatment of fundamental, albeit technically intricate
problems.' As he remarked,
"it may be comparatively easy to formulate the substantive
fundamental rights provisions of a fundamental rights
catalogue, as these necessarily consist of "open", i.e.
indeterminate legal notions which have to be concretized on a
case by case basis in years of jurisprudence. However, it is
arguably disproportionately more difficult to embed such a
catalogue into the multilevel EU and national legal orders and
their interlinked fundamental rights systems - the results of
which are particularly disputed and which are also interlaced
with other European and international human rights
instruments - in a manner which does not only avoid new but
satisfactorily resolves future legal problems ex ante."67
b) Sovereignty and Supremacy
We turn now to the questions of sovereignty and supremacy. The EU is a
post-national polity, suspended between national polities and international
regimes. The challenges of ensuring legitimate and effective governance
will necessarily give rise to some difficult questions about how to articulate
both the longstanding (judicial) principle of the supremacy of the law of the
EU and the gradual consequential transformation of the traditionally singular
sovereignty of Westphalian states into the shared sovereignty of a multi-level
governance structure. The question arose as to how each of these judicial
principles should be reflected in the Constitutional Treaty. For the UK, it
was logical to object to the expression used in Article 1 of the Praesidium's
first draft of the Treaty to the effect that 'this Constitution establishes the
Union'," since the clear derivation from the international law nature of the
Union is that the Member States establish the Union and that the powers of
the Union flow from the Member States, so that the Constitutional Treaty has
only a derived and not an original status. The language of the Praesidium's
draft subtly crossed the bridge between regime and polity, and challenged
concepts of Westphalian sovereignty. The explicit reference to the primacy
of EU law in Article 9(1) of the Praesidium's first draft also riled the UK.
However, the statement that 'the Constitution, and law adopted by the Union
Institutions in exercising competences conferred on it by the Constitution,
shall have primacy over the law of the Member States', as adopted in the
final version of Article 1-6 CT by the IGC, is - as many commented in the
plenary debate on 5 March 2003 - quite unexceptionable in view of the
position under EU law as it stands. Take the Court's statement in 1964, in
Costa v ENEL that,
67 Vranes, above n.62 at p. 15.
68 CONV 528/03, above n.46.
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"The transfer by the States from their domestic legal systems
to the Community legal system of the rights and obligations
arising under the Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation
of their sovereign rights, against which a subsequent unilateral
act incompatible with the concept of the Community cannot
prevail.'"69
Quite apart from what that statement asserts about the nature of what was
then 'Community law', one of the most controversial statements concerned
the so-called 'permanent' limitation of sovereign rights. We will return to
this in a moment. Staying with the supremacy question, for the moment, it is
still worth considering whether or not it is indeed quite unproblematic to
insert a supremacy clause into the Constitutional Treaty, on the grounds of
the fact that this is already a facet of the Union's constitutional order.7" What
the insertion could signal would be an important step towards the merging of
the 'judicial constitution' and the formal legal constitution being worked on
by the Convention. It could be said that this is in the spirit of Article 6(2)
TEU, referred to above, which codifies some aspects of the Court's case law
on fundamental rights. Pursuing the analogy with Article 6(2) TEU and the
utility or effectiveness of codification, however, it is equally clear that this
simple provision does not refer in full to the complex case law in which, for
example, the Court has addressed the question of the extent to which
Member States are bound by the Union's fundamental rights guarantees
when they are acting in some way in implementation of, or within the scope
of, EU law. One thing is for sure, that case law does not speak with a single
voice, and what is more, its interpretation is highly controversial amongst
legal academics. It is interesting to note that partly to preserve the integrity
of EU law as a system, the Council Legal Service was heavily involved
during the negotiations of the Fundamental Rights Charter in 2000 in seeking
to bridge the gap between the Court's case law and the text of the Charter
itself, including its restrictive horizontal clauses. This was achieved through
the drafting of the 'explanations' published alongside the Charter in October
2000."' These explanations referred to the Court's existing case law on the
effects of the Union's fundamental rights vis-6-vis the Member States as a
statement of the present law, and the importance of these explanations has
been buttressed by an amendment to the Preamble to the Charter of
Fundamental Rights as it has been incorporated in Part II of the draft
Constitutional Treaty, to the effect that 'the Charter will be interpreted by the
courts of the Union and the Member States with due regard to the
explanations prepared at the instigation of the Praesidium of the Convention
which drafted the Charter.'
69 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585 at p.594.
70 See the cautionary comments in M. Dougan, 'Some Comments on the
Praesidium's "Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe"', Federal
Trust Online Constitutionalism Essay, 7/2003, at pp.5-6, <www.fedtrustco.uk/
eu constitution>.
71 Nite from the Pmesidium, Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union, Text of the Explanations of the complete text of the Charter as set out in
CHARTE 4487/00, CONVENT 50, CHARTE 4473/00, CONVENT 49, 11 October
2000, <http://www.europarl.eiiint/charter/convent49_erLhtm>.
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What emerges from this saga about fundamental rights and the Court's case
law so far as concerns the question of the 'codification' of the principle of
supremacy is, of course, that codification or consolidation72 of the 'judicial
constitution' will never be entirely unproblematic. Dougan's analysis makes
clear that problems will arise in the case of supremacy, 3 just as Vranes has
done likewise in relation to fundamental rights.74
One area of debate is the precise meaning of the supremacy principle,
whether as general principle of hierarchy or as specific conflicts-resolution
tool. That point is not insuperable, if one accepts that any constitutional
provision on supremacy would in turn require substantial judicial elaboration
over a period of time, and into that elaboration would be built the different
macro- and micro-level functions of the existing principle and associated
legal doctrine, with the Court of Justice drawing upon the rich judicial acquis
since Van Gend en Loos75 and Costa v ENEL and perhaps adapting it to the
changed circumstances generated by the Convention and the IGC.
Furthermore, the argument that to include the supremacy principle is to draw
attention to a facet of EU law best left hidden and visible only to legal
experts and other elites is constitutionally disreputable. On the other hand,
there have been problems with the apparent generality of the principle as set
out in the Constitutional Treaty, in so far as it does indeed purport to apply to
the whole of the Union as a single legal edifice, including the old second and
third pillars. Even if the Union becomes a single legal entity, the now
'subterranean pillars'76 will continue to have legal and political effects,
especially in terms of the differing types of competences given to the
institutions and the varying effects of the instruments in relation to different
areas of Union activity. A distinction will continue to be drawn between
'first pillar' matters, to which the principle of supremacy is currently limited,
perhaps now joined by the third pillar, if the developing trend towards
'communitarisation' of all aspects of justice and home affairs policy
continues, and the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy. A principle
of supremacy drawn from the case law of the Court of Justice on the EC
Treaty might be thought simply inappropriate to this latter field of Union
activity. Above all, though, the inclusion of the supremacy principle - like
the reference to the foundational nature of the Constitutional Treaty in the
Praesidium's early but later superceded draft of Article 1 of Part I - draws
attention to the possibility that the Union is bridging the gap between regime
and polity. It does so despite the fact that the final version in Article 1-6 CT
does not refer to the supremacy of the EU constitution over the national
constitutions. Even so, the formal assertion of supremacy in this way
72 Consolidation is the term used by the House of Lords Select Committee on the
European Union in a report on Articles 1-16: The Future of Europe: Constitutional
Treaty - DraftArticles 1-16, 9t" Report, 2002-2003, HL Paper 61, p. 17 .
74 See Dougan, above n.70.
Vranes, above n.62. For a more positive view on the 'fit' of international,
supranational and national fundamental rights sources in a multilevel
constitutional system, see Pernice and Kanitz, above n.64.
7 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1.
76 The disappearance of the Maastricht pillars 'underground' is an expressive point
made by Kalypso Nicolaides in a presentation to the Federal Trust/UACES Study
Group on the Convention, 7 March 2003, European Parliament Offices, Queen
Anne's Gate, London.
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heightens the tension between the EU legal order and the national legal
orders by reinforcing the fact that in many respects, as things stand at
present, the various systems make incommensurable claims, especially about
so-called 'competence-competence' (the power to determine the legitimate
scope of competence), and that serious conflicts are generally avoided by
judicial interpretation of these incommensurable claims, not by the
intractable pursuit of fundamentally incompatible principles such as the
supremacy of EU law or the sovereignty of the Member States under
international law. To assert as much in the Constitutional Treaty may be to
scratch at the evident sensibilities of many national constitutional courts,
many of which prefer to rationalise the supremacy of EU law by reference to
their own constitutional systems rather than the logic supplied by the Court
of Justice, not to mention public opinion in a number of Member States. Of
course, that may be the intended or unintended effect, but there is no doubt
that crossing that particular rubicon will still require something akin to a
constitutional revolution in Europe and in the Member States.
It is worth dwelling for a moment upon the story of how the supremacy
principle has been moved around Part I of the Constitutional Treaty in its
various versions before the Convention and then the IGC. In Spring 2003
intermediate versions of Title I of Part I of the Constitutional Treaty put
before the Praesidium but not published to the Plenary, the supremacy
principle was not included in the section on competences, but was slated for
inclusion as part of a provision which subsequently became Article 1-5 in the
final version as prepared by the Convention, on relations between the
Member States and the Union.77 This contains the so-called loyalty
principle, a version of what is presently set out in Article 10 of the EC
Treaty, which is as far as the Treaty texts currently in force go towards
formally recognising the supremacy of EU law.78 However, by the time a
full draft of Part I went back to the Plenary at the end of May 2003, the
supremacy principle was (back) in - appearing as Article I-10.' 9 The
Praesidium 'explanations' were terse in the extreme on this question: 'The
reference to the principle of primacy has been accepted, as it is a basic
principle of the Union legal system which has to be laid down in the
Constitution. 0 After the end of the Convention, the provision moved *once
more. During the early part of the IGC, a group of legal experts chaired by
Jean-Claude Piris, Director General of the Legal Service of the Council,
moved the provision again, repositioning it back in the general foundational
provisions of the Union, away from the competence provisions."' This was
done in truth without explanation in the interests of 'consistency'. There it
stayed throughout the IGC, so that it now appears as Article 1-6 CT.
Returning to the question of the 'permanent' effects of joining the EU, the
reference to 'permanent limitation' in Costa v ENEL seemed to some to
suggest that a Member State could not secede from the EC/EU - a point
77 See Praesidium document dated 19 May 2003.
78 J. Shaw, Law of the European Union, London, Palgrave, 2000, 3P ed, at p.297 et
seq.
7 CONV 724/03, 26 May 2003, Draft Constitution Volume L Revised Text of Part
One.
80 CONV 724/03, above n.79 at p.64.
Si See IGC 50/03 and IGC 51/03 of 25 November 2003.
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flatly contradicted in 1981 when Greenland seceded (as part of the
untangling of its relations with Denmark). One way in which the old will
blend with the new in interesting ways in the 'new' Union concerns the
inclusion of a secession or voluntary withdrawal clause.' The approach
taken in the Constitutional Treaty (Article 1-60) seems to imply a slightly
different emphasis to the position elaborated for Canada and the case of
(potential) Quebec secession by the Canadian Supreme Court. 3 The Court
introduced a clear duty on the part of all concerned to negotiate in good faith
should a majority of the people of Quebec decide that they wished to secede
from the Canadian federation. Article 1-60 of the Constitutional Treaty is
premised on the 'decision to withdraw', which is a unilateral act taken in
accordance with the constitutional requirements of each Member State.
Thereafter, the assumption is withdrawal will indeed occur, with the Union
negotiating and concluding an agreement for withdrawal based on guidelines
drawn up by the European Council, and the seceding Member State is
excluded from the discussions in the Council and the European Council on
the withdrawal agreement. Withdrawal can also take effect automatically
after notification of the decision to withdraw, notwithstanding the absence of
an agreement, unless the European Council decides otherwise. The
framework thus assumes an immediate reinstitution of the ann's length
relationship between members and non-members, a point buttressed by the
insistence in Article 1-60(4) that a state having once withdrawn must apply to
rejoin via the normal route laid down in Article 1-58. There is to be no
halfway house associate membership or automatic right to rejoin. This
aspect of the provision is tougher in the final version than in the original
draft.84 Interestingly, in contrast to Canada, where much important
constitutional doctrine, such as on the twin principles of constitutionalism
and democracy, has been judicially elaborated in the context of the whole
issue of Quebec's potential secession and ongoing 'difference' from the rest
of Canada, there have been no judicial interventions thus far on this issue.85
c) Competences
Turning, finally, to the issue of competences, it is widely thought - wrongly,
quite probably - that there has been an unstoppable 'competence creep' in
which the EU and its institutions have gradually encroached upon the
(protected, sovereign) spheres of the Member States.86 Even if the argument
is largely wrongheaded, and is based on a perverted view of the politics of
law-making in the EU context as a politics of winners and losers, 87 one of the
8 CONV 648/03,2 April 2003, Art. 46.
83 Reference by the Governor in Council, pursuant to s 53 of the Supreme Court Act,
concerning the secession of Quebec from Canada [1998] 2 SCR 217.84 CONV 648/03, above n.82.
85 For argument about the potential applicability of this approach to constitutional
flexibility in the EU, see J. Shaw, 'Relating Constitutionalism and flexibility in the
EU', in G. de Btirca and J. Scott (eds), Constitutional Change in the EU: From
Uniformity to Flexibility?, 2000.
See, in contrast, the much more sophisticated diagnosis of the 'problem' of the
competence system offered in Section 1 of A. Verg6s Bausili, 'Rethinking the
methods of dividing and exercising powers in the EU: Reforming Subsidiarity,
National Parliaments and Legitimacy', in Shaw et al, above n.21.87 S. Weatherill, 'Competence', in de Witte above n.62, 45 at p.46.
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greatest challenges for the Convention concerned how it should react to the
argument bearing in mind that the existing system governing competence
attribution, exercise and control is hardly a paragon of clarity in the EU and
could certainly benefit from an overhaul. Moreover, as Franz Mayer has
made clear, the discussion of competences is itself a cypher for other
questions about the nature of European integration."8 However, once the
choice was made for some sort of systematisation of types of competence
and areas of competence, there could be little assistance from the Court's
case law. Notwithstanding its usage of the terms exclusive and shared
competence in the external relations sphere, the way in which the Court has
approached the question has simply not been rationalised in terms of types or
categories of competence. On the contrary, it has used the principle of
attribution, which has unsurprisingly been preserved in Article 1-11(2).
Attribution has been widely used by the Court as the basis for establishing
and testing the limits of competence by examining the scope and context of
each individual legal basis to ensure that measures adopted on that basis
correspond not only to the specific terms of that legal basis, but also to the
wider ethos of EU law. That was the clear implication of the Court's rather
contested judgment in the Tobacco Advertising Directive Case,89 in which it
declared in quite trenchant terms the outer limits of the forms which the
exercise of EU competence could legitimately take in respect of the
regulation of cross-border advertising of tobacco products. This operates
both in relation to the regulation of the internal market as a functional
competence and also in relation to the question of the protection of public
health as a substantive (complementary) competence. Indeed, in terms of the
existence of competence, attribution is the only general principle that can be
found in the Treaties as they are presently drafted, along with a vast number
of legal bases, some of which are more carefully delineated than others, and
of which Article 308 EC giving an implied power to regulate matters falling
within the scope of the objectives of the Treaty is the most controversial. In
addition, the Court has also evolved additional judicial principles such as the
preemption of national legislative competence in certain circumstances and
the doctrine of implied powers to buttress the attribution principle from the
point of view of the efficacy of EU governance. Other principles, such as
subsidiarity and proportionality, govern only the exercise of competence.
The original draft provisions on categories of competence prepared by the
Praesidium were exceptionally inelegantly drafted.' Drafting style is a
resolvable difficulty, and the final versions (Title III of Part I) were a
considerable improvement, and also contain a more reasonable resolution of
the division between exclusive and shared competence, especially in relation
to the internal market. It remains a lingering difficulty, however, that the
attempt to introduce a 'categories' approach drawn from the experience of
other (national) federations does not appear to fit well with the existing
approach to competences which constitutes the acquis communautaire in this
8 F. Mayer, 'Competences - Reloaded? The vertical division of powers in the EU
after the new European constitution', Paper presented at Altneuland: The
Constitution of Europe in an American Perspective, NYU-Princeton University
Conference, April 2004 <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/>.
89 Case C-376/98 Germany v Council and Parliament [2000] ECR 1-8419.
90 See CONV 528/03, above n.46.
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area. One can anticipate, therefore, that a move in this direction could
precipitate considerable uncertainty as the institutions, and especially the
Court, adjust to the new approach, assuming the Constitutional Treaty is
adopted by the IGC and ratified at national level in due course.
In the meantime, the key questions about the scope and nature of
competences are largely resolved not by Part I of the draft Constitutional
Treaty, over which the Convention laboured so long and so hard, but rather
by Part III, which in contrast received much less attention and is, of course,
largely a codification and recapitulation of what is contained in the EC
Treaty with regard to specific legal bases and powers, and so on.
Furthermore, since these provisions do not provide answers to many of the
previously uncertain and open questions - and indeed how could they? - it
seems likely that the debate about competences will continue to rage in the
EU context.
CONCLUSIONS
Many questions about the Convention, the Intergovermnental Conference
and the Constitutional Treaty are left to one side by this paper. This is not a
paper shaped by the normative elements of the so-called Laeken mandate
from the Laeken Declaration, which indicated that the Convention should be
concerned primarily with making the European Union's core framework
more accessible and legible to citizens, as well as more effective, in
particular in view of the substantial 2004 Enlargement. We are not
concerned here with whether or not the Convention and its draft
Constitutional Treaty constitute a European 'constitutional moment',9 or
with the competing internal and external rationales for the construction of a
formal constitutional edifice at this precise stage of the EU's historical
development.92 Instead, it looks at the Convention's draft Constitutional
Treaty as a constitution-building process rooted in a largely analytically
based conception of the EU as an evolving non-state polity.
Moreover, this is not a paper trying to show what theory of integration
applies best to the Convention, or a paper seeking to judge whether a
'Convention plus IGC' configuration is fundamentally different in terms of
the amendment of the treaties to an 'old-style' IGC. In other words, it is not
trying to figure out whether the Convention has produced different outcomes.
In the main, the work in this paper is descriptive and analytical, trying to
work out questions of fit between the old and the new.
Thus, this paper has offered a close examination of some key aspects of the
emergent 'new' European Constitution, concentrating particularly upon the
work of the Convention up to July 2003. The predominant focus is upon the
questions of process and substance which shaped the work of the Convention
91 N. Walker, 'After the Constitutional Moment', in Pernice and Maduro, above n.2.
See also N. Walker, 'Europe's Constitutional Momentum and the Question of
Polity Legitimacy', <www.jeanmonnetprogram.org>; and N. Walker, 'The EU as
a Constitutional Project', Federal Trust Online Constitutional Essay, 19/2004
<www. fedtrust.co.uk/eu constitution>.
92 See G. de BOra, 'The drafting of a Constitution for the European Union: Europe's
Madisonian Moment or a Moment of Madness?', (2004) 61 Washington & Lee
Law Review 555.
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on the Future of the Union. The paper had a set of very modest objectives,
namely to link debates about the Convention process to the substance of
constitution-building and to show the influence of both the old Union acquis
and the new mixed acquis of the Convention itself on the shaping of an
anticipated new constitutional settlement for the EU. It has not been an
attempt to provide an interim assessment of the results of the Convention, in
terms of either process or substance. It is clear that in some cases the fit
between the two is quite unsatisfactory, and this will generate legal and
perhaps political uncertainty for a substantial period of time. Above all, in
this context, simplification - that old mantra - can by no means be
guaranteed. Throughout, the Convention's work has undoubtedly provoked
quite strong reactions, ranging from fierce optimism to rather depressed
pessimism, even amongst those who share the view that constitutionalism
can and should, if pursued effectively as a set of premises about legitimate
rule, offer some sort of legitimacy surplus to the presently much maligned
EU. Balance is clearly a key issue: balancing the interests of the various
constituencies with a stake in the Convention to ensure maximum
acceptability of its final product; balancing growing scepticism amongst
publics about political institutions with the evident sense of goodwill towards
European institutions frequently charted in Euro-barometer polls which
indicate that Europe ought to be given a decent chance to establish itself;
finally, and perhaps most crucially, balancing the new and the old in the
Constitutional Treaty, and re-engaging with one of the oldest conundrums of
legitimacy, namely balancing the responsiveness of institutions including
guarantees of participation, with the need for effective governance and
leadership in an ever more uncertain world.
